

**A THEORY OF FUNDAMENTALISM:
AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOVEMENT**

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FOREWORD

Islamic fundamentalism is growing at such a rapid rate that many believe it threatens to take over the Middle East. To prevent this, enormous resources have been summoned, not only from within the region, but in the West as well. Yet, for all the efforts to contain, if not turn back the fundamentalists, the movement appears likely to pose a security challenge well into the next century.

In this monograph Dr. Stephen Pelletiere points out that containment of fundamentalism depends first and foremost on accurate information about the nature of the movement. He examines the origins of the various fundamentalist groups that are challenging the area's governments, and explains why they were able to grow in the face of official repression by some of the most sophisticated and well-equipped security services in the world. The author concludes by building a theory about fundamentalism, which implies a need to redirect policy for coping with it.

Dr. Pelletiere maintains that the solution is not to try to crush the movement—that has been attempted numerous times and consistently has failed. Rather, the way to proceed is to locate and act on the basic split within the movement between its socially constructive and other more violent elements.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this monograph to help advance understanding about this rising, volatile Middle East phenomenon.

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF THE AUTHOR

STEPHEN C. PELLETIERE received his Ph.D. in Middle East politics from the University of California, Berkeley. In the early 1960s he served in the Middle East as a foreign correspondent during which time he was based in Beirut. Dr. Pelletiere returned to the Lebanese capital in 1970, for a stay at Shemlan, the Arabic language school of the British government. In 1975, when the Lebanese civil war erupted, Dr. Pelletiere was in Cairo, Egypt, conducting research on a Fulbright Fellowship. He interviewed refugees fleeing Lebanon to Egypt, including many United Nations professionals. Dr. Pelletiere has taught at the University of California, Berkeley; at Ripon College, in Wisconsin; and at Union College, Schenectady, NY. From 1982 until 1987 he was an intelligence officer in Washington monitoring the Iran-Iraq War. He came to the Strategic Studies Institute in 1988, and became a full professor in 1992. He has written two books on the Middle East: *The Kurds—An Unstable Element in the Gulf*, and *The Iran-Iraq War—Chaos in a Vacuum*.

SUMMARY

Throughout the Middle East the fundamentalist tide is rising, and shows no sign of cresting soon. Given the extraordinary growth of fundamentalist attitudes, it is curious that in the West so much confusion exists about the movement. Western analysts seem unsure of how to deal with fundamentalism, much less capable of developing effective strategies to combat it. Their difficulty begins with a lack of awareness of the movement's origins. To understand fundamentalism, one must return to the 1970s and the period of the Cold War. The movement sprang from the clash of rightist and leftist forces; this circumstance—of being a product of the Cold War—shaped its development.

This study argues that U.S. policymakers need a deeper theoretical appreciation of Islamic fundamentalism that will explain the many complexities of the movement, in particular, why the fundamentalists have such drawing power within Islamic societies. The study probes the beginnings of groups like the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS); the *Gamiyat*; Hamas; Hizbollah; the Jewish fundamentalist organization, Gush Emunim; and the elusive Muslim Brotherhood.

The author finds a pattern in the way that all of these groups came into being and later developed—the Jewish as well as the Muslim ones. He also notes some ways in which the groups differ among themselves. Taking everything into account—similarities as well as differences—the paper presents a theory about fundamentalism that explains not only the current activity of the fundamentalists, but also alerts policymakers as to what might reasonably be expected in the future.

A THEORY OF FUNDAMENTALISM: AN INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MOVEMENT

Introduction.

Concern about fundamentalism is widespread and this has led policymakers to turn to experts, looking for answers to what the movement is about.¹ The experts have been only too happy to oblige. The experts' advice, however, must be seen as suspect. This is because their theories—almost uniformly—assume knowledge about the movement that is not certain.

Anyone who has looked into the problem of fundamentalism knows that it is terribly complex. Many mysteries are associated with it, and these are absolutely crucial to understand. Until light can be thrown on the gray areas, fundamentalism will remain an intractable phenomenon.²

This study looks at fundamentalism as it exists today throughout the Middle East, and tries to show what information about it is sound, and what is lacking or is suspect. The study focuses on the problematic aspects, arguing that they must be resolved, or policymakers are going to be compromised.

Fundamentalists are adept at exploiting misleading information about their movement. When adversaries of the fundamentalists make wrong assumptions, on which they then attempt to build policy, the fundamentalists invariably seem to capitalize on this. Indeed, it appears to be a favorite tactic for advancing their cause.

The way to proceed, the author claims, is to return to the origins of the various groups to determine what caused them to come into being. Once an understanding of this is achieved, it then becomes possible to reorient one's approach, to construct a theory which, because it is based on sound assumptions, has some predictive capability.

This is what the author has attempted to do; he has contrived a theory, the basic assumption of which is that fundamentalism—widely perceived as a radical movement—did not start out that way. It actually began as a movement of reform. The reformist current dissipated quickly, but this did not occur until the reformers found themselves balked by the regimes that they were trying to influence. Unable to carry their reforms into action by peaceful means, the original leaders withdrew from the movement. Then new elements took over—mainly from among the youth—and initiated what must be viewed today as an area-wide populist revolt.

The study speculates about this “youth takeover,” and what the significance of this might be. It also notes a peculiarity of fundamentalism which—to the author's knowledge—makes it unique among movements of this type: that the original reformist element, while retreating into the background, has nonetheless continued to be involved, even to the

extent of participating in some of the violent activities. This fact may be of consequence; it could provide a means of gaining influence over the movement, or at least of deflecting some of its angry energy.

Method.

The study starts with a look at three manifestations of Islamic fundamentalism—the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, the so-called *Gamiyat* in Egypt, and Hamas in the Israeli occupied territories. These are considered together for a reason—operationally, they have all developed along similar lines, and today they are—in structural terms—practically mirror images of each other. The fourth and fifth movements to be examined, Hizbollah, and the Jewish fundamentalist group, Gush Emunim, are structurally quite different.³

The method will be to review the recent history of each movement, and then separately to consider the mysteries connected with it. The author will then move to theory-building; and finally will present his theory on fundamentalism. He will conclude with a series of recommendations for policymakers to consider.

Fundamentalism Among the Sunnis.⁴

In Algeria the fundamentalist movement did not come about until the late 1980s, and then it developed practically out of nowhere. Up to this time, religion was kept out of politics, due to the nature of the regime. Avowedly secular, the government tolerated religion, but barely.⁵

Nonetheless, there existed a kind of shadow movement of religious influence, which performed what in the West would be called good works. Very conservative, devout Muslims ministered to congregations of primarily urbanized peasants. A feature of this activity was building mosques in the *baladi* districts of the great urban centers.⁶ These so-called free mosques competed with mosques that were government sponsored. The latter were viewed by Algerians as corrupt—mere appendages of the official bureaucracy.⁷

At the same time, however, the *shaykhs* who operated the free mosques did not seek to take power from the government. There is no evidence of subversive activity by any of these individuals prior to 1988. Perhaps for this reason the government left the free mosques alone. The free mosques also provided social services that the government was unable to supply.

Algeria, a significant oil producer, was hard hit by the fall in oil prices in the mid-1980s.⁸ The Algerians were not among the foremost producers, however they did reasonably well from the sale of their oil. Once the world oil price collapsed, the country suffered.

The economic downturn affected the government adversely in two ways. It deprived the regime of funds needed to run the country and, in effect, it forced the regime leaders to

show their mettle. In the past they had solved problems by throwing money at them; now they had to become efficient administrators. This was impossible; the government was notoriously corrupt and inefficient.⁹

Algeria's rulers, as they struggled to cope with diminished resources, exposed themselves badly. The people saw that they were not up to the challenge confronting them. Hence the populace grew restive, and, in late 1988, terrible riots erupted. The proximate cause of these is something of a mystery. The blowup seemed spontaneous, although some saw it as a government scheme that backfired.¹⁰

Thousands of youthful Algerians (mostly unemployed) poured into the streets in demonstrations that continued for over a week. Why were these demonstrations so prolonged and so violent? Clearly, the government bore much responsibility because the army, in putting down the unrest, is estimated to have killed somewhere around 200 people.¹¹ This so enraged the rioters that a spiraling escalation developed. Out of the riots, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) was born.

Seeking to end the rioting, the government quite early on appealed to the country's religious leaders to calm things down, and this the clergy attempted to do. Rallies were held in which the crowds were harangued to leave the streets, or at least to desist from looting, as they were doing. But once the rioting had ceased, certain clerics organized the FIS movement. The clerics who took charge of this movement were Ali Bel Haj and Abass Madani.

The FIS's initial action was to form itself into a political party and compete for seats in the local elections. The ruling party, the National Liberation Front (FLN), appears at this point to have blundered. It seems to have miscalculated the appeal of the fledgling movement, which did surprisingly well in the local elections and thus was encouraged to try for seats in the parliament.¹² However, the military seized the reins of government and attempted to push through gerrymandering rules that would have favored the FLN in the upcoming elections. When the FIS leaders called for a general strike, to protest this action, the movement leaders were jailed.

Still, the movement might not have turned violent had it not been for a subsequent development. In January 1992, the President of Algeria stepped down and in his place a High Security Council took over. This Council was seen as a healing agency, one that would work to overcome the widespread divisiveness. In particular, Algerians were cheered by the presence on the Council of Muhammad Boudiaf, a revered leader of the original 1954 revolt against the French. However, by June 1992 Boudiaf had been assassinated, and many in Algeria concluded that this was the work of the security forces.¹³ Elements of the FIS decided that the army could not be trusted. They went underground, forming the Army of Islamic Salvation (AIS). This group ultimately split, and an even more radical organization came into being, the Armed Islamic Group (AIG). The movement thus entered into its present violent phase.

Commencing in 1993, the FIS began to subside as a significant influence in the country. Indeed, it is problematical whether the FIS has any control over the action groups. It may possibly control the AIS, but there is no evidence that it controls the AIG. Indeed, the activities of the AIG are vicious. This group has thwarted efforts by the military to end its resistance, and has succeeded in raising the level of attack. Today, what is happening in Algeria is tantamount to civil war. Over the past 3 years it is estimated that as many as 40,000 may have died in this struggle.¹⁴

Discussion.

Several mysteries surround what is going on in Algeria. The first concerns the origin of the revolt. How did the affair develop? Although there are many factors that might have produced the riots, a revolution is something else. To trigger a revolt more is needed—much more—and we shall try to show that this extra something was missing in the Algerian case.

Anger over the government's inept handling of the economy certainly played a role. As previously stated, the youths who rioted mostly were unemployed, and largely this was due to the oil crisis. Having a mass of youths without employment is clearly detrimental; but it is doubly dangerous if virtually all the youths are crowded together in a few urban ghettos. Under such circumstances, disaffection can spread rapidly; all it takes is for a few hotheads to begin agitating. This appears to be what happened.

Latent hostility against the government, then, was a factor contributing to the outbreak. Still, we want to know what *specifically* set this off? Was there any one issue, or complex of issues, that drove the youths to violence? It seems there was—to begin with, the government's housing policy. Not enough apartments were available in the major cities.¹⁵ Waiting lists were subscribed years in advance, and, to get on a list, one had to have influence.

First claim to apartments went to a privileged few, the so-called “martyrs” of the revolution. These individuals had either fought in the 1954 revolution, or were family members of those who had. The fact that such a category existed, with first-claim privileges—not only to apartments but to virtually everything else worth having in the country—rankled many. Those who were not so advantaged felt themselves denied, and many of the embittered ones were youths. Without an apartment one cannot marry, have a normal conjugal relationship—in effect, fulfill oneself as a man.

Cultural divisions within the community were another factor contributing to the outbreak. No sooner had the FLN defeated the French, than it proclaimed Algeria to be an Arab country. Unfortunately for it, however, the French were nothing if not thorough colonizers. Hence, when the FLN took power there was not much “Arabness” left in Algeria. To be sure, Algerians thought of themselves as Arab, and certainly few Algerians ever denied their religion—the overwhelming majority were avowedly Muslim. At the same time, however, the upper classes spoke, and had been educated, in French. This was

particularly the case with Algiers, the capital. To offset this state of affairs, the regime was forced to import Arabic teachers, the Arabic language having ceased to be the vehicle of learned discourse.¹⁶

Nonetheless, despite the regime's insistence on nurturing its Arabness, the country's leaders did not stick to their resolve. They soon began backsliding, the allure of French culture apparently being too great. The leaders sent their children to school in France. They vacationed there. They banked there. They favored the French language over Arabic. They even dressed in the French style, and watched French television.

Along with this, the early regime leaders co-opted the bureaucracy that the French had left, filling it with their own people. In retrospect this was a bad move, since the bureaucracy became a refuge for elite elements. It turned into a *nomenklatura*, as existed in the Soviet Union.¹⁷ The bureaucrats drew apart from the rest of Algerian society, isolating themselves from the general populace. This drove an even deeper wedge into the community. Those who were not part of the elite languished, as they had very little hope of bettering their lives.¹⁸

The period between the early 1960s and 1989 marked the growth in Algeria of a virtual caste system, based primarily on one's position in the *nomenklatura* (and, of course, this included the military). Thus, the country was culturally divided. The masses spoke Arabic and were largely from the countryside, or else had moved to the city at a recent date.¹⁹ These recently urbanized elements had come to Algiers and Oran and Constantine to better themselves. Instead, they were blocked by a Franco-phone elite of civil servants who used their bureaucratic connections to keep them down.

As long as there was money to operate an effective welfare system, the discontent of the underclasses could be accommodated. When oil prices declined, however, and money became scarce, the government had to trim its welfare system.²⁰ Many began to face real deprivation and social antagonisms sharpened.

Thus, there would appear to have been sufficient grounds for revolt in the underclass. Usually, however, revolutions occur when the *middle class* becomes disaffected. In Algeria, the middle class certainly was disenchanted with the regime, but it did not abandon it.

Seeking to discover the *why* of the revolution, many experts have turned to conspiracy theorizing. They have speculated that the rioting was instigated by the clerics.²¹ Further, it has been claimed that, before the rioting broke out, money from overseas flowed into Algeria to the *shaykhs*; the implication being that this money subsidized the rioters.²² Evidence to substantiate such claims is lacking, but those who embrace this argument point to the emergence of the FIS as proof that the clergy did, in fact, plot against the government.

This is an inappropriate line to take. The fact that the clergy may have benefited from the revolt cannot be cited as proof that they brought it about. One must show that the clergy aimed at precisely this result, and to do that one must examine their behavior. Here, one immediately gets into difficulty because the violence occurred *before* the clergy became involved. Algeria's unemployed youth were on the rampage before the clergy came forth to calm things down, which they did at the behest of the government.

Weeks after the rioting had been controlled the *shaykhs* from the poorer neighborhoods formed the FIS, thus creating what is now the significant movement of opposition in the country. One could argue that the radical clerics consistently aimed to produce a revolt. The behavior of the clerics belies this conclusion. The original founders of the FIS were peacemakers, seeking to further their aims within the system. Their first action (once they had taken over the movement) was to form a political party, and then compete in local elections. Scoring unexpected gains in this arena, they stepped up their electioneering—all a perfectly good democratic practice. Indeed, one could argue that the FIS lost out because it *failed* to capitalize on the initial unrest. If the aim of the FIS, from the first, was to seize power *by any means*, it could have called for an insurrection while the populace was aroused. By participating in the elections, it allowed the FLN to recover, after which the military leaders drove the FIS underground.

If there was no single element plotting a revolt, how did one occur? To find the answer to that question, we have to return to the early days of the rioting and consider what happened during that time—1988.

The Algerians who created what eventually turned out to be a revolt did not initially intend to do so. They were merely expressing opposition to the regime, raising issues in a democratic manner. The clergy *made an issue* of the riots and the government's maladroitness in handling of them to mobilize a protest movement, and then they rode that issue to success in the local elections. Further, given the way the elections turned out, it would appear that many in the middle class, if they did not vote for the FIS, at least did not support the FLN. The failure of the FLN to mobilize what should have been its natural constituency was in a large part responsible for the debacle. It seems that both the middle class *and* lower class elements wanted a change, and—in the early stages of the crisis—that was all they wanted.

Once one adopts the position that revolution was not originally on the agenda, one has no need to discover a conspiracy, or to make much of the *Islamicness* of the affair. In the Arab world (as in black America, and in Catholic Central and South America), clerical involvement in protest movements is not unusual; religion traditionally has served as a vehicle for such activity. Nor would the participation of the clergy have been a concern to many. It would not have signified a clerical takeover of the government, and the institution of an orthodox form of rule (one in which the *shari'a* was implemented).²³ Algerians likely would have interpreted the clergy's involvement as a sign that discontent was serious, and, had the regime been willing to address the situation, subsequent trouble might have been avoided.

In sum, prior to 1988 and the outbreak of the riots there was no movement in Algeria bent on overthrowing the government. For at least the first few months after the movement had formed no one within it seriously looked to seize power from the nation's rulers, at least not by force.

This begs the original question—where *does* the unrest, indeed, the terror come from? At some point the FIS became transformed into the AIG, with its attacks on foreigners, blowing up of airlines, and all of its other terroristic acts. Why did this occur; who, or what was behind it?

The author's answer would be that the Algerian Army initiated the resort to terror by refusing to compromise with, and later by trying to crush the FIS. Military repression drove the more restless spirits of the FIS to organize the AIS (and subsequently the AIG), and these outfits, operating underground, produced the present bloody confrontation. The author will have more to say about Algeria later, but next will consider Egypt.

Events in Egypt.

Unlike Algeria, an activist religious movement existed in Egypt prior to the outbreak of fundamentalist agitation in the late 1980s. In the 1920s, a minor cleric, Hasan al Banna, formed the Society of Muslim Brothers, an organization dedicated to revivifying Islam among the Egyptian masses, and concurrently combatting Great Britain's imperial control of the Egyptian state. This outfit operated until the 1952 revolution, which overthrew the king.²⁴ The Society ran afoul of the Free Officers, who led the revolution—a falling out precipitated by the Officers' drawing close to the Soviet Union. The deeply conservative Brothers objected to such ties. Consequently the Officers attacked the Society in 1954 and again in 1965, wounding it grievously. Many Brothers went into exile (quite a few in the Gulf, where some became wealthy), while others went into hiding at home.

Nonetheless, in the 1970s Anwar Sadat sought to rehabilitate the group as a foil against his foes, the Nasserites. Sadat had fought the largely successful 1973 war whereby he had retrieved the Sinai (lost to Israel in 1967). In the process, he had expelled thousands of Soviet advisors from Egypt, and now the President wanted to lead his country into the Western camp. He faced opposition, however, from the Nasserites—old-style leftists, some of them ideological Marxists. The leftists were entrenched in the government after years of Arab Socialist rule.

Sadat declared war on this element, and, to help him, recruited the Brotherhood. Brothers in exile were called home and offered aid in reestablishing themselves.²⁵ Those underground in Egypt were urged to come out of hiding.

The maneuver apparently was successful. The leaders of the Nasserites were arrested, many jailed, and some executed.²⁶ To be sure, many of the leftists were never rooted out—they opportunistically adapted to the changed environment. But in the end, the forces of

the left were subdued, and Egypt seemed to strike out in a new, more conservative direction.

For a time, the conservatives and regime leaders cooperated. Then gradually the relationship frayed. It is by no means certain what caused the falling out, but ultimately there was a showdown. Sadat launched an attack against elements of the religious community—in particular the Brotherhood— similar to that visited on the Nasserites. At that point Egyptian society polarized.²⁷

Sadat was assassinated in 1981, apparently by religious fanatics. The deed has been blamed on the Brotherhood, although, in the author's view, the evidence does not substantiate this.²⁸ Still, the religious right clearly was upset over Sadat, and just after he died there was an uprising of sorts in Upper Egypt.

When Mubarak took power, he did not confront the religious forces. He seems to have appreciated that—given the temper of Egyptian society at the time—he would do better to assume a conciliator's role. He allowed the Brotherhood to exist, and this seemed to return the country to calm. At the same time, however, Mubarak did not concede to the Brothers on the one issue that really mattered to them—he refused to legitimize the Society as a political party, which would have allowed it to compete in elections.²⁹ Blocked in this area, the Brotherhood pursued other schemes. For example, it virtually took over several professional societies and labor unions, placing its people in the executive posts.³⁰ In this way, the movement continued to expand, and thus the tension between it and the government was perpetuated.

Tensions in Egypt took an unusual turn in the late 1980s, with violent outbreaks in Upper Egypt. There were several manifestations of this, including attacks on tourists and inter-communal fighting between Christian Copts and Muslims.³¹ As the level of violence rose, the government began to intervene aggressively, until finally the security forces undertook what amounted to another major crackdown. This, however, only succeeded in making matters worse, and then, unexpectedly, there were severe disruptions in the capital. At this point Mubarak announced the discovery of a clandestine fundamentalist network, which he labelled the Islamic Groups, or *Gamiyat*.

Following this revelation, fighting between the alleged *Gamiyat* and the government intensified. Several assassinations were attempted, in which some high officials were actually killed.³² A brutal repression launched by the government failed, and, when the violence flared again, Mubarak accused the Brotherhood of being behind the *Gamiyat*. Indeed, he claimed that it was the Society's military wing.³³ Today, the Brotherhood, the elusive *Gamiyat*, and the security forces are all in an uneasy standoff.

Discussion.

The major mystery is the *Gamiyat*. What is it, and what, if any, is its connection to the Brotherhood? The *Gamiyat* is, in the author's view, a fiction—or at least it is in the sense

that Mubarak construes it. The violence is real—the assassination attempts, the attacks on police, the murders of tourists; all of this is real enough. But, that a single entity is orchestrating these actions, and that this entity is the Brotherhood, using the *Gamiyat* as its vehicle, is doubtful.

The violence in Egypt can be broken down into three separate categories. First is the unrest in Upper Egypt, which borders on civil war. Next is the so-called *Gamiyat* violence, much of which takes place in Cairo. Finally there are the Brotherhood-regime confrontations, which initially were peaceful, but soon became quite bloody.

Mubarak ties all three together, saying that the Brotherhood is masterminding events, with the *Gamiyat* cadres functioning as the Society's shock troops. The aim of this combination is to bring down the regime, according to Mubarak.

The problem with Mubarak's proposition is that the most violent activity (that in Upper Egypt) can be explained without recourse to conspiracy theory, as can the so-called *Gamiyat* violence, which is connected to the events in Upper Egypt. This leaves the Brotherhood-regime confrontations, which do not appear directly related to either of the other two.

After Sadat's death, the Upper Egypt area experienced a rebellion of sorts. This was the only real violence in Egypt following the assassination.³⁴ Many were not surprised that violence occurred here. Upper Egypt is known to be refractory. For centuries Upper Egyptians have mistrusted the government. Whenever the latter is weak, they try to exploit this condition. Further, the Upper Egyptians are puritanical Muslims. Mubarak made much of this fact when he mounted his campaign against the fundamentalists. In fact, however, the community is predominantly tribal, and this, more than the religious attitudes of its people, explains what went on there.

By the 1980s the Egyptian government had become aware that its most lucrative industry was tourism. The government naturally undertook to build that industry, which meant opening previously isolated areas like Upper Egypt to foreign penetration (the area is the site of some of Egypt's most extraordinary antiquities). In the past, tourism had been introduced to Upper Egypt but kept within bounds because of misgivings about the local population. It was unlikely they would tolerate hordes of foreigners descending upon them.³⁵

Mubarak decreed that, like it or not, the area would be opened. As might have been predicted, clashes ensued between elements of the population and the so-called *khawajas* (foreigners). The zealots did not like the way that the foreign women dressed; they intensely disliked what they perceived as the foreigners' impiety. And most of all they did not like the foreigners' attitude towards themselves—being a tribal people, the Upper Egyptians hold themselves in high esteem, and do not expect to be patronized.

The author would argue that early instances of anti-tourist violence in Upper Egypt were the work of zealots within the community, but that this hostility was not broadly based. At the same time, it seems likely the police overreacted. At the first hint of trouble, the provincial administration blanketed the area with police, who made numerous arrests, ultimately setting off an area-wide revolt. Upper Egyptians observe the code of vendetta, whereby physical abuse incurs a debt of honor. The fact that the abuse is inflicted by government officials acting under orders in no way mitigates the offense. Soon, natives were laying siege to the provincial police stations.

Thus it would seem that a combination of events brought on the crisis, and that this was not in any way a premeditated affair.³⁶ The locals did not plot a civil war against the government; the security forces did not mean to incite any such action. Given conditions in the area, the disturbances could hardly have been averted.

The next chapter of the story unfolds in Cairo. Over the years rural elements have been immigrating to the capital, and settling in the *baladi* quarters there. These quarters previously were spotted throughout the city, some downtown within blocks of the great international hotels—the Hilton, the Semiramis, and Shepherds. Sadat apparently decided to clean up downtown, and so decreed a facelifting for the city center. Under the decree, whole neighborhoods were uprooted, and the citizens relocated. Dissatisfaction among the displaced residents increased when they found themselves relocated into new neighborhoods, in some cases mixing Muslims with Copts.³⁷ This led to fierce sectarian clashes.

Then, in 1992, a major earthquake wreaked devastation on many poorer quarters of Cairo, and—unfortunately for Mubarak—the bureaucracy did not provide relief quickly enough.³⁸ The Brotherhood moved in and virtually took over the relief effort. This so angered the President that he ordered private relief workers to be ejected, which touched off major riots. Mubarak then backed down, apologized, and blamed his underlings.

All of the events, reported in the international media, raised speculations that Mubarak was in trouble.³⁹ Mubarak, however, countered skillfully. On the eve of his visit to the United States in 1993, he charged that his government was under siege by religious fundamentalists.⁴⁰ He pointed to events in Algeria where the junta had recently outlawed the FIS, and he claimed that the Algerian fundamentalists and those in Egypt had allied, and that the whole Middle East was coming under assault from the fundamentalists.

Mubarak thus adroitly turned the tables on the media, using the alleged fundamentalist agitation to plead for assistance from the United States. The formula, as Mubarak posed it, was a simple one—support my government, or my regime may succumb, which will not be of benefit to the West.⁴¹

Mubarak's version of events was widely credited. However, under close examination, the claims do not hold up. The activity in Upper Egypt, for example, consisted mostly of peasants sniping at tourists from cane brakes, and throwing petrol bombs at police

stations.⁴² In Cairo, there was plenty of unrest—clashes between Copts and Muslims, and between the locals and the police. All of this certainly was vexing, but it was nothing that Egypt's security forces could not handle.

Even the assassinations, which, according to Mubarak, are tied to the *Gamiyat*, are suspect. For the most part they involve anti-police actions—most of the figures targeted for execution were high police officials. As the police and natives escalated their feuding, the violence grew more intense; finally, to avenge the debt, the highest police officials were executed.

Some evidence supports this interpretation. For example, the modus operandi of the militants is primitive. Many of the bombs used in the assassination attempts appear to have been homemade.⁴³ Egyptians have been fighting in wars for several decades now, and thus fabricating bombs would not be a problem for them.⁴⁴ At the same time, however, professionals would be more sophisticated in their methods, and would be likely to have better equipment.

The most telling evidence, however, would appear to be the casualty count. It is estimated that between 1992 and the present roughly 600 Egyptians have been killed in this struggle.⁴⁵ In a country of 60 million, relatively speaking, that is not a lot. The casualty count in Algeria is much higher, as noted above. Annual losses due to crime in a major American city surpass Egypt's toll.

In the final analysis the violence in Egypt seems more a form of anarchy than an organized attempt at revolution. Egypt is going through a period of socio-economic turmoil; the government is having difficulty managing pressures that are accumulating, and is resorting to greater and greater use of force, to which the community is responding with violence.

To be sure, aspects of the *Gamiyat* activity cannot be accommodated under this explanation. How, for example, does one explain the attempts on the life of such popular figures as Egypt's Nobel Laureate Naguib Mahfouz?⁴⁶ That matter will be discussed below, after an examination of the Brotherhood's role in this.

The Brotherhood.

To understand the Brotherhood and the role that it plays in the political life of Egypt one needs to know something about the country's economic situation. The Brotherhood derives its membership primarily from the private sector—small shopkeepers, teachers, professional workers. This element has been most keenly affected by the economic policies of Sadat, and then of Mubarak.

Egypt under Nasser, and for most of the Sadat years, was socialist—Arab Socialist, as the Egyptians called it. This was an unwieldy, and in many ways, ineffective system. Moreover, during the Cold War, Egypt's major trading partners came from the Eastern

bloc. Thus, with the collapse of so many of these regimes, Egypt suffered, losing markets on which it depended. It is therefore understandable why, today, Egypt finds itself in a desperate economic condition.

Sadat, to improve the situation, sought in the mid-1970s to move the country into the Western camp, not just politically, but economically as well. This was the intent of the so-called *infitah*, the “opening” to the West. Sadat’s idea was to privatize Egypt’s many public sector industries and allow foreign business to compete with Egyptian entrepreneurs. Had Sadat had his way, Egypt might have entered the global system of free trade. However, before Sadat died his plan had foundered. As mentioned above, there was resistance to it within the community. Indeed, in 1977, terrible food riots erupted when Sadat tried to remove many popular subsidies.⁴⁷

Mubarak let Sadat’s economic initiatives languish, apparently because he, too, sensed the deep antipathy towards them which prevailed. However, Mubarak was in a particular bind. He had to do something to bring the country out of the quagmire into which it was sinking; he had to get the country back on its feet economically.

Had there been comity among the Egyptians, a feeling on the part of all that they should pull together, Mubarak perhaps could have turned the situation around. However, Egypt has always had a peculiar style of rule. It is traditional for the country to be governed by autocrats. Sadat ruled that way, as did Nasser. Both were natural successors of Muhammad Ali, the founder of modern Egypt, and, perhaps, the autocrat of all autocrats.

Mubarak wanted to institute democracy, as he sensed, correctly, that this was what Egyptians were yearning for. At the same time, however, his instincts were to play the *ra’is* (boss), the style of his predecessors. In the end, Mubarak settled for the latter. He made a few pro forma gestures toward democracy but never followed through. Thus, when conditions began to worsen in the country, he found himself alone.⁴⁸ The attitude of the Egyptians was, if he (Mubarak) wants to be the *ra’is* (boss), let *him* work things out. If he cannot do this, the responsibility for failure will be his.

It was at this juncture that unrest developed within the religious establishment, which was ominous for Mubarak. In Egypt, once the clergy withdraws its support from the government, matters become difficult. The *shaykhs* exercise great influence over the people, and—under the proper circumstances—can count on considerable support from this quarter.

Resistance from the clerical establishment, in part, was a legacy from Mubarak’s predecessor. When Sadat invited the Brotherhood back to Egypt, and began to promote the religious right (to fight the leftists), he did it at a peculiar time. The world just then was witnessing the start of the Soviet Union’s collapse. Indeed, Sadat’s action in driving the Soviet advisors out of Egypt could be said to have presaged the slippage in Moscow’s power position.

The forces that Sadat set loose in Egypt have never been brought back under control. The religious right has, in effect, been riding a wave that just goes on cresting. As the “godless” left lurched from one demoralizing defeat to another, the religious right grew in potency and in aggressiveness. The religious forces in Egypt today are more assertive than at any time since the end of World War II; indeed, they are perceived to be the only truly forceful opposition in the country.

A significant proportion of Egyptians—masses as well as elite—look to the religious leaders for guidance, and, when called upon by the leaders to protest, they may comply, confident that they have religious sanction. In this instance, opposition was expressed by massive turnouts for Friday mosque services.⁴⁹ At the services certain preachers went so far as to castigate Mubarak’s government, stigmatizing it as “godless.”⁵⁰ This was a serious charge, and one which Mubarak could not let stand. Some of the preachers lost their pulpits, being forcibly ejected by the security forces.

There were thus similarities between what was occurring in Egypt and what went on in Algeria. In both places the mobilization of religious forces evoked a significant popular response, including elements of the middle class. The latter were expressing discontent with the regime, but they were *not* calling for a revolt. Rather they wanted to move the regime in a new direction, more congenial to their interests.

Furthermore, Egypt is in a dreadful state economically. The government seems unable to improve Egyptians’ standard of living, and largely this has come about because the country is not producing—indeed it has not produced throughout all of the Arab Socialism years.⁵¹ Thus Mubarak is left with but one option, to appeal for loans from the international financial community.

Loans come with strings attached. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) wants Mubarak to impose an austerity program, and, along with that, it has been pressuring him to open Egypt to the global market. This takes us back to the days of Sadat, being precisely the course of action he tried to pursue, one which ultimately was abandoned due to public hostility.

As a consequence, Mubarak now finds himself trapped between two fires. Austerity would almost certainly lead to popular unrest. The free market is opposed by the entrepreneurial elite, who do not feel able to compete against the multinational corporations. Placed in this untenable situation, Mubarak has chosen to temporize.

The President stonewalled the IMF, and to justify his failure to act, raised the specter of a fundamentalist revolt.⁵² This has long been a tactic of Third World leaders under pressure from the international lending community. What was disturbing, however, was Mubarak’s willingness to involve the Brotherhood. From his standpoint this made sense, enabling him to avoid complying with the IMF-dictates, and, at the same time, to throw up obstacles to the Brotherhood’s bid for political legitimacy.

At the same time, however, Mubarak's maneuvers have gained little support at home. If anything, the President's actions have boosted the standing of the Brotherhood, which could develop into a significant anti-regime movement. To his credit, Mubarak has succeeded in crushing unrest in Cairo. However, he has done so at a considerable cost, as many Egyptians are disturbed over their loss of civil liberties.⁵³

Interestingly, the Brotherhood's strategy, in responding to the attacks, has been to exercise caution, going out of its way not to provoke retaliation.⁵⁴ The Brothers apparently feel that they can stand up to the regime, and that ultimately Mubarak will be forced to back down. This approach may backfire, however—youthful members of the organization are clearly impatient for action, and already significant defections have occurred. It begins to be doubtful whether the leaders can control the rank-and-file.

Hamas and Gush Emunim.

Hamas is in the vanguard of the anti-Israel fight. Among groups fighting from inside the territories it is without peer. To a large extent, the fundamentalist challenge is taken seriously today because of Hamas. No other resistance organization has caused such concern among Western policymakers. Despite all the attention, however, aspects of Hamas's career are obscure. One area in particular has been neglected; Hamas's relationship with the Jewish fundamentalist movement. It can be argued that the latter turned Hamas into its course of violent activity. The author considers the Jewish fundamentalists briefly, then shows how the two groups are related.

Basically, Jewish fundamentalists are committed to turning Israel into an exclusively Jewish preserve, to encompass so-called *eretz* Israel (greater Israel), the territory as it existed in Biblical times. This would include the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, in other words, all of the areas now being negotiated with the Palestinians. Eretz Israel, originally, was a concept of the Land of Israel Movement (LOI).⁵⁵ LOI ideologues were secularists, whose dream of recreating ancient Israel was a form of romanticism.

The timing of the LOI's appearance is revealing—it came after Israel had defeated the Arabs in the Six Day War, which shifted huge tracts of territory to Tel Aviv's control. Thus it seemed possible to fulfill the Biblical prophecies. This was not, however, an idea that commanded wide support. Indeed, Israel's founding fathers had specifically rejected any such move. Israel's first president, David Ben Gurion, was a pragmatist, who believed that the country should be built on land that was available.⁵⁶

After the 1973 war, however, popular attitudes among the Israelis changed. To be sure, in purely military terms, Israel won that war. Nonetheless, the successful seizure of Israeli-occupied land in the Sinai by the Egyptians traumatized the Israelis, sending repercussions through the society. In particular, the Israelis were disturbed that Washington could seemingly compel them to enter into negotiations with the Arabs, and force them to surrender territory.

Many in Israel had become comfortable with the idea of a vigorous, aggressive Jewish state. That Israel's borders might now be set was not a pleasing prospect to them. Some Israelis, sympathetic to the LOI, sought to turn the public's adverse reaction to account. In 1974, Rabbi Moishe Levinger formed the Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful).⁵⁷

The Gush had as its goal, not only to retain the territory Israel held at the end of the Six Day War but to annex it. In that way, it subscribed to the ideology of the LOI. However, where the original LOI adherents were secularists, the Gush was religious. Rabbi Levinger and his followers believed that God commanded the Jews to settle *eretz* Israel—it was a divine injunction.

The first action taken by the Gush—in an attempt to sabotage the Camp David Accords—was to form a party of squatters in the Sinai. Although the initial assay of the group failed, the Gush was not deterred. It shifted to establishing settlements outside the Green Line (in the West Bank, Gaza and Jerusalem). The Israeli government stopped all but one of these attempts. The Gush succeeded in establishing Kiryat Arba, outside Hebron.⁵⁸

For 10 years after its formation in 1974 the Gush seemed to be law abiding. But then it was discovered that the organization was plotting to blow up five busloads of Arabs. Moreover, under interrogation, Gush members confessed to having boobytrapped the cars of several Arab mayors in 1980, two of whom were permanently maimed. And finally, the police learned the Gush planned to blow up the Dome of the Rock. Located in Jerusalem, this is one of Islam's holiest shrines.⁵⁹

The Gush claimed that these actions were perpetrated to avenge violence against Jews, carried out by indigenous Palestinians. In fact, the native Palestinians were fairly quiescent during this time. The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), prior to 1987, had virtually given up organizing resistance inside the territories. The PLO leaders believed that the Israeli occupation forces were too formidable. It was felt that any attempt to operate from inside the territories was sure to fail.⁶⁰

Moreover, the Palestinians in the territories had worked out a *modus vivendi* with the occupiers, who employed them in a variety of capacities. They were looked on by Israelis as good low-wage workers. This aspect formed the basis of the relationship. That the Palestinians were needed by the Israelis seemed to guarantee that they would be taken care of.

Given the nonadversarial relationship between Palestinians in the territories and the Israelis, the PLO was not motivated to make trouble. Rather it concentrated on pressing the issue of self-determination in the United Nations. To be sure, this was not all that it did; it also carried out *fedayeen* raids into Israel from its base in southern Lebanon. But this was a way of keeping up the pressure, by making life uncomfortable for the Israelis.

The real fight, in the PLO's view, went on in the United Nations, and for that an active resistance inside the territories was not necessary.

The appearance of the Jewish fundamentalist movement in the territories disturbed the Palestinians greatly. Their belief that they were safe under the occupation was shaken. What particularly shocked them was the creation of Kiryat Arba. The Palestinians had expected the Israelis to abide by international law, which forbade such activity, and thus were content to allow the United Nations to address the wrongs done to them. The creation of Kiryat Arba raised the specter of a complete Zionist takeover of Palestinian lands.

Among the Israelis, a basic shift in attitude occurred in 1977 when the dominant Labor Party lost its first national election to the Likud. Likud was a party considerably to the right of Labor, and it upheld the principle of Jewish settlement *anywhere*. Moreover, it backed up its belief with legislation. The Likud effectively opened the West Bank and Gaza to land takeovers by Rabbi Levinger's group.⁶¹

Two developments, then, coming in late 1970s and early 1980s, frightened the native Palestinian community. One was the appearance of a messianic Gush Emunim movement, bent on fulfilling the Biblical prophecies, the second, the ascension to power of Likud, with its policy of unlimited settlement.

Although not formally tied, Likud and the Gush certainly were in sympathy. In fact, the Gush appears to have seen itself as a kind of unofficial arm of the Likud Party, treading where Likud politicians feared to go. They planted settlements in areas officially off limits. While Likud leaders censured the Gush, the settlements remained. Thus more and more areas outside the Green Line were taken over by Jews.

Nor were the Gush zealots deterred by attacks by Arab villagers. They repaid violence with violence. Gush Enumin did not seek protection from the IDF. Rather, it was armed and prepared to look out for itself. Many of the Gush's members were army reservists.

After 1977, tensions mounted inside the occupied territories, with the Jewish fundamentalists pressing their assaults on the Palestinians. The Palestinians fought back, but barely effectively. What the community needed, desperately, was an organized resistance organization. That need was about to be fulfilled. Interestingly, however, the organization was to come, not from the PLO but from King Hussein of Jordan.

The Coming of Hamas.

In 1982 the IDF stormed PLO enclaves in Lebanon, as a consequence of which a long shadow fell over the Palestinians living in the territories. The Palestinian commandos—and indeed the entire Lebanon-based community of Palestinians— was driven north to Beirut. Subsequently, the PLO accepted a humiliating surrender whereby—in return for safe

passage out of Lebanon—it agreed to relocate permanently across the Mediterranean in Tunisia.

This retreat effectively crippled the PLO. Since it no longer had access to northern Israel, it could not claim to be spearheading the anti-Israel fight.⁶² Having given up southern Lebanon—its staging area for *fedayeen* raids—the PLO was *hors de combat*.

This created a leadership vacuum among the Palestinians. To be sure, the PLO did not recognize this fact; Arafat maintained that he could carry on the fight as well from Tunis. However this simply was not credible. Palestinians under the occupation needed someone to look after their interests, someone positioned to be instantly on call for help. With the PLO far from the scene, only one individual could provide that kind of protection—King Hussein of Jordan. The King had been the community's mainstay in the past. He could be so again.

In the 1948 war, Jordan seized the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Subsequently, in 1950, the King annexed them as part of his kingdom. However, after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, the King was forced to give back these territories, with the result that hundreds of thousands of Palestinians flooded into what remained of Jordan, where they lived in exile.

The King attempted to take the exiled Palestinians under his protection. Initially he was successful assimilating them as Jordanians. But the PLO as a group was not easy to control. The commandos had a high regard for themselves, and a corresponding disdain for the King's largely bedouin army.

Tension between the PLO and bedouin soldiers exploded in 1970, when the army assaulted the PLO camps and literally ran the commandos out of the country, pushing them across the border into southern Lebanon. This episode has since come to be known as Black September.

Black September was more than a clash between military units. Behind it were conflicting views of how the occupied territories were eventually to be disposed of. The King believed the territories—or at least the West Bank and East Jerusalem— belonged to him. Arafat wanted the areas as part of a future state of Palestine.

In 1974, the Arab League, meeting in Rabat, settled the question of Palestinian representation in Arafat's favor. This meant that King Hussein lost his claim to the territories, a loss he felt bitterly. Although the King seemed to accept the League decision, his subsequent actions cast doubt on this. Most interesting was his decision—taken just after Rabat—to allow the Muslim Brotherhood to go into the territories, to administer a social welfare program there.

This was not the same Brotherhood that fought against the regimes in Egypt. It was, rather, a branch of that organization, one that had been formed in Amman, and subsequently had grown to be quite powerful. Moreover, the Jordanian branch of the

Brotherhood reckoned itself among the King's staunchest supporters.⁶³ Thus, when the Brothers went into the territories—in the mid-1970s—many assumed that this was an attempt by King Hussein to reassert his claim, by having the Brotherhood become his agent among the Palestinians.

The PLO leadership certainly drew this conclusion and they seriously were alarmed by the move. In Black September, the Brothers had taken to the streets to fight against Arafat's forces alongside the bedouin units. They could thus be expected to oppose the PLO inside the territories. Unfortunately for the PLO, since it had no infrastructure on the West Bank and in Gaza, there was not much it could do about it.

Once inside the territories the Brotherhood created two institutions, an Islamic Center and Islamic University.⁶⁴ These became bases from which to proselytize the Palestinian youth, who until then had been only nominally involved in political matters. The Brotherhood's role was a lot like that of Tammany Hall in New York City politics in the late 1800s. It awarded material aid, arbitrated neighborhood disputes, and acted as mediator between the local community and the Israeli authorities. And, in the process of carrying out these functions, the Brotherhood made enemies. Not only PLO supporters but numerous Palestinian leftists opposed the spread of the fundamentalist doctrines.

Then, in December 1987, the *intifadah* exploded into a veritable firestorm, with rioting that went on for weeks.⁶⁵ The previously docile, noninvolved community of Palestinians was passive no longer. This was the beginning of a great popular revolt, caused in part by confrontations between settlers and natives.

Now the need of the Palestinians for a defense force was urgent. The Brotherhood was the logical candidate for this, but it held back. The idea of such a force went against everything that the organization stood for. The Brothers' idea was to proceed slowly, to educate the masses, and then ultimately to take power by peaceful means, but never to succumb to the lure of violence.⁶⁶ Now, as the fighting raged, more and more of the younger members of the group began to break away from the parent organization and join the street fighters. Finally, to stanch the defections, the Brotherhood leaders agreed to the formation of Hamas, a completely separate organization. Hamas advertized itself as the Brotherhood's fighting arm.

For a time, the IDF made no move to curb Hamas. Indeed, it seemed actually to encourage its activities. The reason for this was that—even in the early days of the *intifadah*—Hamas fought the PLO and the "leftists"; it spent as much time fighting them as it did the occupation authorities. At a point, however, Hamas changed, and this compelled the IDF to move against it.

The subsequent crackdown of the IDF on Hamas has been quite harsh, to the point that the organization has been thrown into disarray. Today, it has fractured into numerous quasi-independent gangs. These exist without much organization, and virtually no discipline. How they manage to survive is a great mystery—as quickly as leaders are

arrested or killed by the Israelis, new ones rise up to take their place. In this respect, the modus operandi of Hamas is similar to that of the *Gamiyat* in Egypt and the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria (about which we will have more to say below).

Meanwhile, conditions inside the territories continue to deteriorate. Recently, the situation in Gaza became so bad that Rabin appeared ready to abandon it, simply pull out and leave the community to shift for itself.⁶⁷ This did not happen, and, as a consequence, the struggle has since escalated.

Discussion.

The major question having to do with Hamas is its behavior toward the PLO. How could it go on fighting that organization, when that could only benefit the Israeli enemy?

In fact, the PLO-Hamas antagonism appears to be ideologically based. As stated, the Brotherhood, which is the parent of Hamas, is an offshoot of Hasan al Banna's group in Egypt. While the Palestinian section and the Egyptian Brothers grew apart over the years, in one respect they remained similar. They are both extremely conservative organizations. Both share an abhorrence of "communists." The military junta in Algeria, the Arab socialists in Egypt, the PLO—all, in the minds of the Brothers, are communists. The Brothers, and their cadres in Hamas, apparently equate communists with atheists.

It would appear that the religious forces are obsessed with fighting leftists, whom they look on as their existential foes, an attitude that the leftists reciprocate. Indeed, fights between the two go back for decades. They fought in Egypt under Nasser and Sadat, in Jordan in the late 1950s and early 1970s, in Syria in 1982, and now the fight is going on still in the occupied territories.⁶⁸

Thus in the eyes of the Brotherhood—and its proxy Hamas—defeating the left takes precedence over practically all else. At least this was the attitude until 1990. It was then that Gush Emunim reopened its campaign against *Al Haram Al Sharif* (the Dome of the Rock).⁶⁹ The Gush regards *Al Haram Al Sharif* as the site of the Second Temple, and they would like to build a Third Temple there, once they have torn down the Muslim mosque which sits atop the Temple's archeological remains.

When, in 1990, the Gush announced that it would attempt to lay a cornerstone on the Temple Mount—as the Jews refer to the site—mobs of Muslims converged there, to be met with hundreds of Israeli Border Police, who opened fire, killing 21 persons. After that, Hamas announced that it would lead an armed revolt against the occupation, which prompted the Israelis to step up their military presence in the territories. After that *intifadah* violence became almost uncontrollable.

Thus it would seem that Gush Emunim, by attacking the Holy of Holies, upset the calculus of the Hamas cadres. Whereas previously the PLO was their principal foe, now

the fundamentalist Jews have supplanted them. The latter threatened the basis of the cadres' belief, incarnate in the great Mosque. For Hamas this was unforgivable.

The Hamas cadres seemingly have a rank-order for their enemies. When their calculus was upset, in the *Al Haram Al Sharif* affair, it changed their perceptions. The fight inside the territories turned into a religious war between Islamic and Jewish fundamentalists. The Hebron massacre and the recent suicide bombing at Beit Lid are evidences of this. It is almost as though the PLO and Israeli government are sidelined, watching in dismay as the deadly struggle escalates.

Another mystery is why the Israelis decided to let the Brotherhood into the territories in the first place. They were pleased to have the religious forces and PLO fighting each other, but there was more to it than that. The territories are a financial drain on the Israelis. When the Brotherhood offered to take over social services there, the Israeli government acquiesced. After all, the Brotherhood was not perceived—at the time—as a disruptive force. Hamas did not exist when the Israelis made their decision. Had the Israelis anticipated the appearance of Hamas, almost certainly they would have acted differently.

Hizbollah.

Hizbollah, the last group to be considered, is the most potent of them all. Unlike the others, however, it is not Sunni; it is Shia. Hizbollah is supported by Iran, although Syria supplies it with some logistical aid, and exerts influence in the group's favor.

Hizbollah is unique among the Arab fundamentalist movements because it was set up by a foreign government. There is no doubt about its foreign ties.⁷⁰ To be sure, all of the Hizbollahis are Lebanese, but, the organization almost consistently has followed Iran's line. This does not mean that Hizbollah is absolutely subservient. Iran is in disarray politically, which has left Hizbollah considerable room to maneuver.⁷¹

Today, in Lebanon, Hizbollah is divided between moderate and extremist wings. The moderates have begun to experiment with the electoral process, and recently they elected eight representatives to Lebanon's parliament. The extremists remain determined to crush the Jewish state.

The Lebanese Shias' grievance against Israel involves land, which Israel seized from Lebanon along the southern border. This was Shia territory, and the Shia community wants it back. Hizbollah is spearheading that fight.

One of the more puzzling aspects of Hizbollah is its tendency to reinvent itself, having gone through a number of incarnations. It first appeared in 1982, when Israel invaded Lebanon to drive out the PLO. The IDF went all the way to Lebanon's capital, Beirut, which led Syria and Iran to conclude that the United States and Israel were conspiring to takeover the Levant.⁷²

Quickly, volunteers from Iran's Revolutionary Guards arrived in Lebanon, ostensibly to support Syrian and leftist forces trying to hold off the Israelis. In practice, however, the Revolutionary Guards seem to have had a hidden agenda—to organize the Lebanese Shia community in the Beka'a Valley.

The Shia community in Lebanon is the largest single ethnic group in the country. It has for decades been depressed economically, and politically uninvolved. Around the 1960s, however, the Shias began to mobilize. They developed a political consciousness and disputed their lowly status among Lebanon's other communities, all of which had been politically active for years.⁷³

The Revolutionary Guards exploited this heightened political activism. First, they established a social welfare network to provide services the community lacked, and for this they used money supplied by Tehran.⁷⁴ Once this was operating, the Guards began organizing the community militarily—they created Hizbollah, essentially a militia dependent on Tehran. Initially Hizbollah functioned as a terrorist organization. It seized American hostages, and also was responsible for several suicide bombings—such as the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, that of the French peacekeepers, and an Israeli garrison in Tyre. These operations were successful in the sense that they goaded Israel to pull back from Beirut, and induced the Americans to quit Lebanon entirely.

After this, Hizbollah passed through the first of its transformations. With Syrian assistance it began to convert itself into a guerrilla organization. Syria was instrumental in gaining an exemption for Hizbollah so that it alone, of all the Lebanese militias, was not required to disband under provisions of the Taif Agreement.⁷⁵ For years, Hizbollah cadres infiltrated Israeli's self-proclaimed security zone in southern Lebanon, harassing Israel's proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA). For most of this period Hizbollah was not much more than a minor irritant to the Israelis. Since it was not very proficient, its effectiveness was limited. However, starting in the early 1990s the group began carrying out more and more sophisticated operations. By the summer of 1993, it had begun to undermine Israel's position in the south, and, as a consequence, Prime Minister Rabin ordered a massive assault, just short of a reinvasion. The south was bombed and strafed, and Lebanese homes were blown up by tank fire. When the operation ended, however, Hizbollah came back, reattacking the IDF and SLA, and in the process killing nine IDF soldiers.⁷⁶

Shortly thereafter an Israeli unit allowed itself to be overrun by Hizbollah, precipitating a furor in the Knesset.⁷⁷ The IDF launched an official investigation into the unit's behavior. Subsequently it was brought out that, because of Hizbollah, Israeli units in southern Lebanon were being forced to live under siege-like conditions, unable to operate outside their forts for fear of ambushes.⁷⁸

In February 1995, in cooperation with other guerrilla groups, Hizbollah launched simultaneous attacks on Israeli positions all along the Lebanese-Israeli border.⁷⁹ This last

operation led the Israelis to initiate harassing tactics of their own. The Israeli navy has bottled up several Lebanese ports. Lebanese fishermen can no longer go out for their catch.⁸⁰

Today, it would appear that along with the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, Hizbollah is the most fearsome guerrilla group operating. Effectively, then, this is a third transformation; Hizbollah is now able to carry out combined operations over a wide area, a major step from its previous *modus operandi* of making hit-and-run raids.

Discussion.

There is only one mystery to consider in regard to Hizbollah, and that is why the Lebanese Shias, with relatively little political consciousness, allowed themselves to be turned against the United States. This was an extraordinary step for them to have taken. Heretofore, practically all of the resistance groups had focused on overcoming the Israelis. The Lebanese Shias bypassed that stage to focus on the United States as their principal foe.

The Shias appear to have been influenced by their Iranian patrons. Since the days of Iran's prime minister Mossadeq, when Washington intervened in Tehran's attempt to nationalize British-owned oil fields, a significant portion of Iranians have hated America.⁸¹ They see it as the successor of the British imperialists. In particular, these Iranians harbor a deep resentment for the CIA's 1953 restoration to power of the Shah.

Antipathy for the United States is nothing new in the Middle East. But prior to the coming of Khomeini it was virtually inconceivable that any group—for example, the Iraqi or Syrian Ba'thists—would presume to fight East *and* West simultaneously. This was what made the Khomeini Revolution so different, that the Khomeinists viewed Washington *and* Moscow as equally devilish.

When the Iranian Revolutionary Guards arrived in Lebanon, they brought their ideology with them. They indoctrinated the Lebanese Shias to see the world as they saw it, however simplistically. There were the forces of darkness, which included communism and capitalism, and there was Islam. Israel, to the Iranians, was an adjunct entity, subsumed by the greater evil.

This attitude may be gaining authority among the Middle Easterners. Indeed, it has begun to surface among the Brotherhood cadres, who have developed the concept of the "Crusaders."⁸² That is, the Brothers look on the growing influence of the United States in the region as a return of the Crusaders, evidence of the fact that the West is trying to destroy the Muslim faith. Whether this is a widely held conviction is debatable; but it is present, and is being voiced with greater and greater frequency.

Theory Building.

What is striking about the performance of these religious movements is their ability to attract, and to hold popular constituencies. This is most apparent with the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). The FIS example is particularly illuminating because it is so clear cut. There was no religious opposition in Algeria prior to the FIS, therefore we must infer that the movement's ability to challenge the regime was built on support *picked up after* the rioting.

It seems obvious on what this support is based. The clerics speak the language of the masses, particularly the barely literate urbanized peasants.⁸³ They also have lived among them, whether in the urban ghettos or in the *baladi* villages. Under such circumstances, trust can be achieved fairly easily.

Moreover, the appeal of the clerics has a material basis. The mosques take care of people's wants. They supply food; they help out paying bills; they also act as intermediaries with the government. This was seen in almost all of the cases studied.

Under Islam, mosques have always performed this role. Indeed, the Koran commands wealthy Muslims to care for the poor; it imposes a special tax on the wealthy to do this.⁸⁴ Giving alms, then, is a tenet of the faith.

All of the regimes currently beset by the fundamentalists share a common background. They all initially tried to take over the welfare-providing role of the mosques, and failed. When they did so, they turned back to the mosques, and asked them to reassume their charity dispensing activities. The mosques gladly complied, but, then, in the process of doing so, they deliberately set about to undercut the regimes' legitimacy.

Thus, there appears to be a correlation between the governments' ability to provide welfare and to maintain community control. Once the regimes stopped looking out for the people's economic well-being, they provided openings for the religious conservatives to expand and take over politically.

We next want to consider the ambivalent behavior of the religious forces. Why were they, in practically all cases, unwilling to use violence early in their struggle with the regimes, when later on they positively embraced it? Everyone of these movements (with the exception of Hizbollah) eschewed violence in the beginning. Instead, the leaders opted to work through the system. And, even when balked by the governments, they still held off. Later, however, the movements became wildly violent; some of them now appear to be absolutely out of control. Why do they behave in this way?

To get at this requires probing the nature of the clerical establishment under Islam. The *alims*, that is the religious leaders, traditionally have looked on themselves as intermediaries between the people and the rulers. In time of community tension, they feel it their duty to defuse violence and direct emotion into well-regulated channels where compromises can be made.

Given this disposition on the part of the *alims*, there would be no incentive for them to instigate a revolt. To do so would be to undercut their position in the society, which they have built up over the course of centuries. However, what appears to have occurred is that the clerical establishment has undergone change in recent years. Among Muslims today, there still exist traditional clerics, who are conservative and inclined to support of the government. Many of these individuals are paid civil servants.⁸⁵

Along with these “establishment clergy,” there are increasing numbers of so-called free clerics, individuals who have no government ties, and, in many instances, seem deliberately to avoid establishing such links. These people appear to be caught up in the present violent activities. The author does not know when this phenomenon (of the free clergy) developed, but it is easy to see how it would have come about.

Sunni Islam, unlike Catholicism, does not have a formal religious hierarchy. Any Muslim who has studied at the *madrasa* (religious school), and has received a diploma can set up as a *shaykh*, after which he performs essentially the same role as does a clergyman in Christianity. However he must find his own means of support, which he does by gathering a congregation. That congregation will, assuming it approves of the *shaykh*, provide for his maintenance.

Those *shaykhs* who decline working for the government, or who may not have had the opportunity, can yet exert influence over the community because they are not perceived as having been bought. Indeed, there may be a relation between speaking out and being taken care of. If a cleric takes stands that are controversial, this may enhance his reputation, which would be of material benefit to him.

To the degree that they are willing to speak out, recalcitrant *shaykhs* perform a service to Muslims at odds with the regime. They can explain to congregants under pressure—those who find themselves slipping into poverty—why this is happening to them. A *shaykh* who blames the woes of the community on the regime probably is telling the congregants what they want to hear.

This would explain the drawing power of small *shaykhs* operating in villages in upper Egypt, but what about the great mosque preachers of Cairo who also speak out against the government? These *shaykhs*, too, are fulfilling a need. For middle class congregations also are upset with the government; they, too, want to be told that the regime in power is derelict.

What is interesting, though, is that the same message is interpreted differently by two different audiences. Poor villagers, told that the regime is corrupt, may take this as a signal to drive the rulers from power. The middle class, on the other hand, may interpret the message as a call for reform.

The point, however, is that the *clerics* are not agitating the *movement*; they are responding to prodding from the people, who are discontented with the regimes in power and want to have their grievances articulated. Why go to clerics for this, when in the West a politician would suffice? First, under Islam, there is no separation of church and state; Muslim clerics have not foresworn politics, as is usually the case with clergy in the West. Additionally, after a half century of misrule under secularist leaders, Muslims may naturally turn toward clerics as more trustworthy.

The secularists had plenty of time to prove themselves during the Cold War years. Not only did they fail, they did so egregiously. The Six Day War, Black September, and the tragedy of Beirut are but a few of the failures of the secularists—leftists and rightists alike. Once the hold of the secularists was loosened—as happened under Sadat—the religious forces reemerged, as if they had never been in eclipse, and they recaptured their hold over the public.

This explains the ability of the Brotherhood to survive after Sadat's and Mubarak's efforts at repression. Similarly, in Algeria, the FLN's belief that religious influence had been done away with proved illusory.

The author has narrowed the focus of the investigation to two groups within Muslim society whose activities have brought on this crisis of fundamentalism—the youth and radical clergy. These two are the principal disturbers of the peace, and on them the author builds his theory.

The Theory.

The theory is: what the West regards as a movement of religious fundamentalism is in reality a conservative reaction to over a half century of misrule by secular regimes. This reaction was spearheaded by the clergy, because—given the entrenched nature of the regimes—only the clergy could stand up to them. Even the most obdurately secular ruler would think twice about defying the demands of the clerics for reform. Rather than confront the clerics head on, he would be more likely to try to conciliate them.

When, however, the rulers, in effect, dug in their heels and refused to proceed any further long the path of reform—as in Algeria—the moderate clerics who were originally associated with the movement withdrew. Rather than incite the mobs to violence, they simply subsided; to all intents they abandoned the movement. Mubarak, and the Algerian junta, both maintain that this pullout was a sham, that the conservatives are still involved; they are orchestrating the activities of the radicals from behind the scenes, they say. The author doubts this explanation. It seems more likely that the conservatives were not interested in, and indeed had cause to fear a mass uprising, since this would strike at their interests.⁸⁶

At the same time, however, the elders' unwillingness to confront authority changed the tone of the movement. Rebellious youths took this on themselves. They kept up the

agitation, and, in the process of doing so, won support of elements of the clergy who were themselves radical. In this way the movement preserved its religious cast. In fact, however, it is not, as it exists today, primarily a religious movement anymore; it has taken the form of a populist revolt, which has broken out in at least two important Middle Eastern states.

The question now becomes where is all this heading? Is this movement going to spread? And, if so, which states are next in line to be assaulted? This would appear to depend on the regimes in power. To the extent that they are willing to open up to the people, they can probably avoid confrontation. But, as the examples of Egypt and Algeria have shown, the rulers are not disposed to be so yielding. In the case of Algeria, the army seems to feel that it must repress the popular forces at all costs. Mubarak has been somewhat more compromising, but even he of late has shown himself to be obdurate. As for the Palestinians and the Hizbollahis, the outcome depends on the peace process.

There is one more point to taken up before we pass to a discussion of what the United States can do about this, that is the matter of violence against individuals who constitute no threat to the movement. The previously mentioned stabbing of Naguib Mahfuz is a good example of this. Such actions apparently are crimes, egregious acts of violence, which serve no useful purpose. Indeed, Mahfuz would appear to be the last person one would want to attack. By winning the Nobel Prize he brought honor and glory to his country.

The key is to understand what happens when a regime is stigmatized as “godless.” In fact, it is stripped of its legitimacy, which means that Muslims need no longer obey such a government. The injunction may be construed as binding, that is as an *obligation* not to obey.⁸⁷

At the same time it appears that, under the Koran, there are any one of a number of permissible responses. One can simply withhold cooperation, while on the surface appearing to obey—observing the forms of submission while hardening one’s heart against the regime. Or one can speak out against it. In the most extreme case, one can take it on oneself to correct the un-Islamic condition that obtains. This last scenario would appear to be what is going on with much of the *Gamiyat*-type violence in Egypt. Individual Muslims, acting on their own initiative, pass judgment on perceived offenders, and then execute the judgments.

One could argue that this does not, or should not apply to Mahfuz, since he is not part of the repressive government apparatus. True, but he does represent something noxious in the minds of a particular class of Muslims. He is seen as someone who has sold himself to the enemies of the faith by writing blasphemous articles and books about it. Thus, his presence within the community was perceived as an abomination, which must be expunged.⁸⁸ No one has taken a contract out against him. Nonetheless he has become a target for any Muslim who has the opportunity to strike him down.

If this interpretation is correct, it reveals something about what is going on, not only in Egypt but throughout the entire Arab world. Mubarak, Rabin, and the leaders of the military junta in Algeria, have all claimed that the fundamentalists are highly organized and obedient to central authority. This does not appear to be the case. The character of the violence belies this—it is much too random and spontaneous. Much of it appears to be committed on impulse, and indeed this may be precisely what is happening. Once the *shaykh* has pronounced against the regime, it is up to individual Muslims to decide how they will respond. The *shaykh* does not tell them how to act; nor does he help in carrying out the action. This is solely up to the individual. It is really not much different than workers performing acts of sabotage. In fact, this would appear to be a good description of what is occurring—a form of sabotage.⁸⁹

Individuals in Muslim society who are only marginally effective are acting out their frustration and rage by attacking the system whenever the opportunity to do so presents itself, or when their rage becomes insupportable. Such activity may seem quixotic; it may ultimately be doomed. The authorities certainly are going to fight back, and they have the will and organization to do so effectively. Still, the attacks *are* taking place, and they are extremely difficult to relate to.

One of the criticisms leveled at the fundamentalists is that the leadership seems incapable of generating effective tactics. It has been claimed that, were there effective leaders within the movement, the regimes under assault long ago would have been swept from power. This theory overlooks the extraordinary resources on which the regimes have to draw—the Israeli presence in the territories is overwhelming; Mubarak has legions of security forces; the Algerian army is equipped with the most up-to-date equipment. Given this massive security presence, the tactics the militants have devised are fairly shrewd. Stabbings, suicide bombings—these are the sorts of actions that security forces cannot easily deflect.

These actions are in the tradition of anarchist violence that flourished in Europe in the last century, specifically in the Mediterranean countries of Italy and Spain.⁹⁰ If this is a rebirth of that type of anarchism, then it is more serious than has been recognized, and it certainly is something that should concern U.S. policymakers.

Implications for U.S. Policy.

U.S. policymakers need to rethink their attitudes toward the fundamentalist movement, and they should start by breaking it down into its parts. One obvious element is the youth, who are involved everywhere and want an end to their near-hopeless economic situation. What is it that they are up against? Essentially, the fact that their societies are caste-bound. All of the regimes under attack by the fundamentalists are run by elites who have been long in power, and are now in the process of trying to form dynasties. Algeria is the prime example of such a caste-bound society. Its leadership has refused, despite the starkest warnings, to open up to elements demanding participation.

In the author's view, Egypt is in the same condition as Algeria, particularly with respect to the army. Egyptian officers live well. Inside their compounds, with their own shopping areas and schools, they are virtually insulated against contact with the outside world. And they are maneuvering to have their sons and daughters inherit their extensive privileges.

At one time, the privileged situation of the armed forces did not attract great opposition among Egyptians. This was when the country still was at war with Israel, and the people looked to the military for protection. However, a whole generation has grown up which has never seen the army fight, and—if the peace with Israel holds—probably never will. This younger generation does not defer to the military, and may, in fact, harbor antagonism towards it.

The middle class is another element. What makes the middle classes in Arab lands so restless? Clearly they find the regimes in power unresponsive to their concerns. The regimes are military; they came into being to accommodate the requirements of the Cold War, which was essentially to align the Arab peoples with one world power bloc or the other. In that sense, the regimes were internationally oriented—how they fitted into the international security picture determined their survival chances.

But today what is going on in the international arena is less important to Middle Easterners. The middle classes are preoccupied with domestic issues, particularly having to do with business affairs. To expand commercially, the middle classes need relief from stifling bureaucratic control. At the same time, however, Middle Easterners are not receptive to reforms being advocated by the IMF. They know that they cannot compete against the multinational corporations, were the latter to be allowed into their countries. Hence, U.S. policymakers must ask whether it is wise to force the Arab middle classes to go along with the IMF, come what may. If forced to do so, chances are they will turn against the United States. If the youth *and* the middle class are lost, what is left?⁹¹

One of the peculiarities of this movement is that moderate reform elements coexist alongside the radical youth.⁹² It might be that the United States, by propitiating the moderates, could split them from the radicals. The way to do this would be for U.S. policymakers to de-emphasize the IMF economic reforms for awhile and concentrate on specifically political measures.

Unless Egypt is to explode with unresolved class tensions, there must be some move toward democracy. A system in which the Brotherhood was enfranchised would offer an outlet for some of the pressures. Nor does it seem there would be much to fear from such a move. The Brotherhood is the party of conservatism, and thus it does not seek radical solutions to Egypt's ills. Egypt's political system, with the Brotherhood included, would certainly change, but as long as the radicals were kept in check, this would not be so dire.

Algeria is more problematical because the destruction there is so far advanced. Many members of the middle class appear to have already fled the country. Still, there may be

hope, inasmuch as the FIS—the original protest movement—yet survives, and recently it and other reformist organizations met in France to draft a proposal for ending the fight, which seems to have promise.⁹³

As for Israel, there has to be a compromise struck here as well. For awhile it seemed that this was a possibility. The Declaration of Principles seemed to signal a new beginning of the peace process. It appeared for a time that this was a true breakthrough, and that the parties on both sides—the PLO and Rabin government—would compromise to move the process along. However, at present chances for peace appear to have dimmed considerably.

The Palestinians insist on some form of statehood and they want East Jerusalem put under Palestinian control. Israel remains adamantly opposed to either of these demands. Given the mood of the Palestinian people, it is hard to envision a solution that does not compromise on one, or both of these issues.

Moreover, if the Rabin government continues to dodge these two, Hamas will be the winner. It will extend its influence over the youth in Gaza and the West Bank, and the PLO will recede farther and farther into the background. The PLO will end up being of no consequence, and the *intifadah* will move into the phase of permanent revolt, as in northern Ireland or South Africa.

Recommendations.

What specifically can the United States do about this? First, looking at Egypt, the aim should be to get Mubarak to open the political system. The United States should work for this. Why has it not already done so? It seems that the policymakers have been consumed with the peace process. Mubarak has skillfully inserted himself into the process as an essential go-between who can facilitate matters on both sides. U.S. policymakers, wanting to see him perform this role, have been unwilling to restrain him in any way. Thus Washington has not spoken out forcefully against government repression in Egypt, and that has not been lost on Mubarak's domestic opposition.⁹⁴

On the positive side, the United States undertook recently to encourage a national dialogue in Egypt between the regime and opposition forces. Mubarak initially agreed to this, but then he excluded the Brotherhood from the exchange. The United States did not put pressure on the President to change his stance, and consequently the exchange came to nothing.⁹⁵

Similarly in the case of Hamas, U.S. policymakers want a settlement of the decades old Palestinian-Israeli conflict. They recognize that the Israeli government is under pressure from hardliners unhappy at the prospect of giving up land.

Apparently, for this reason Washington has not pushed Rabin on the settlement issue. But the settlements are the crux of the dispute. Rabin has maintained that he cannot move

on the settlements until the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) first cracks down on Hamas. The PNA, on the other hand, points to the settlements as a constant source of friction, inciting inter-communal strife. There ought to be a quid pro quo possible here. Let Rabin close down one of the settlements, on condition that Arafat extract a pledge from Hamas to impose a moratorium on violence, until Palestinian elections can be held.

Finally is Hizbollah, which the author views as a *sui generis* case. Created by Tehran, this organization has consistently deferred to the Iranians. It is therefore, to a large degree, lacking independence. Nonetheless, a careful study of the career of Hizbollah, and in particular of its behavior lately, indicates that it, too, is seeking to become autonomous. Indeed, were the Shias to get their land back, it is likely that Hizbollah would go out of business—out of the guerrilla business, that is.

As for the Jewish fundamentalists, such as Gush Emunim, the United States should disavow any group, Arab or Israeli, that endorses terrorism and indiscriminate violence.

What then should be the approach for U.S. policymakers? The United States must not become implicated in the machinations of regimes under assault by the fundamentalists. If the author's theory is correct, fundamentalism is a system-wide social upheaval which is affecting the entire Middle East. Areas that have escaped will be caught up sooner or later; it is just a matter of time.

The United States must not be overwhelmed by this phenomenon, and that is a matter of positioning. When the wave breaks, as seems to be inevitable, we must be able to maneuver ourselves to safety.

As a start, a thorough reassessment of fundamentalism is in order. Policymakers have to determine how far the influence of the movement extends. How widespread is this sentiment for change? Next, the policymakers should ascertain how the United States can facilitate change, without undercutting U.S. interests, which in this part of the world are vital.

It seems no exaggeration to say that the year 1996 will be crucial for the United States. To a degree, the United States is on trial. Up until now the anger of area natives has been directed at unresponsive governments, but these groups could just as easily turn against Washington. We must keep in mind the example of Iran, and the conviction of the hardliners there that America is the number one enemy. U.S. policymakers should do everything possible to resist the appearance of a Sunni variant of the Iranian revolution.

ENDNOTES

1. To a large degree the problem is not of the theorists' making. The fundamentalism movement has gone through too many changes in too short a time. As a consequence it has been difficult to assess accurately what is going on. In the early 1980s some excellent studies on fundamentalists appeared in English. All were keyed to the assassination of

Sadat, tended to be heavily involved with Islamic scholarship, probed complex doctrinal points of religion, and went into considerable detail about relatively obscure groups. See Ali Hillal Dessouki, *Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World*, New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1982; John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1984; R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Islam in Revolution*, Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1985, and Dilip Hiro, *Holy Wars*, New York, NY: Routledge, 1989. Then—with the difficulty in Algeria—a whole new set of books and articles appeared, concentrating on the terroristic aspect of fundamentalism. Martin Kramer's writings fall into this category, as do Barry Rubin's. See Martin Kramer, "Islam vs. Democracy," *Commentary*, January 1993; "Islam and Democracy," *New Republic*, March 1, 1993; and, Barry Rubin, *Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 1990. After the World Trade Center bombing, the focus shifted yet again, as authors endeavored to make the case that Islam had declared a holy war on the United States. See Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?," *Foreign Affairs*, Summer 1993, pp. 22-49. At the same time, however, Esposito published another book which specifically spoke out against any such notion. See John Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992.

2. Throughout the study, the author uses the term fundamentalism, aware that some controversy exists about this. Many commentators have called for a new way of describing the movement. Some have suggested referring to the militants, not as fundamentalists, but as extremists. Others have argued that political Islam is a better expression than fundamentalism. The author finds that, while all these alternatives have some merit, they each, in their own way, present problems. He has, therefore, stuck to the term fundamentalism, which is now so widely used as to have gained a place for itself.

3. The Muslim Brotherhood originally appeared in Egypt, although it soon spread to Jordan and Syria, and later to the Sudan and Libya, and to a number of other Middle Eastern countries. The Brotherhood figures prominently in two of the movements to be examined in this study—the *Gamiyat* in Egypt and Hamas in the occupied territories.

4. The Muslim religion is divided into two major groupings, the Sunnis and Shias. Simplistically, one could say that the Sunnis are the orthodox element of the faith, and the Shias the loyal opposition. Over the years the two have been at odds, but basically they agree on fundamentals. The significant difference is that the Shias believe that the role of leader of the world Muslim community can only be performed by a blood relative of the Prophet Muhammad. Iran is predominantly Shia; most of the Arab countries are Sunni.

5. In fact, immediately after the 1954 Revolution, the secular component of the resistance effectively—and brutally—purged the religious figures who had supported driving out the French. Hence, opposition to the secularists, among the country's religious leaders, was not only on ideological grounds—the leaders had a debt of vengeance to pay.

6. *Baladi* is Arabic for "of the country" or "villager." In Algiers these districts are scattered throughout the city, and often exist next to fashionable neighborhoods. This is

the case with Hydra, the diplomatic quarter and home of Algeria's elite. See *The Financial Times*, "Algerians try to stay cool in quartiers chaud," Weekend, March 11-12, 1995.

7. Government co-optation, or attempts at co-optation of the religious community, is a phenomenon in all Middle Eastern countries. It exists in the Arab Socialist countries as well as in Saudi Arabia. In Egypt, a 1911 law established the Supreme Council of al Azhar, which turned all the *ulama* (religious scholars) into state employees. Sadat in the 1970s went further, introducing a law whereby the government was empowered to dismiss an *alim*, and even remove his name from al Azhar records, thus rendering him ineligible for any job, government or religious. See Hiro, *Holy Wars*, 1989, p. 78. Also see Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 1984, pp. 127-128. Esposito writes:

Nasser . . . involved the government in Islamic affairs when he nationalized al-Azhar University, the oldest Islamic university and a major center of religious authority As a result, the university lost much of its independence both academically and politically. Government control of Al Azhar as well as those mosques whose *imams* [prayer leaders] were appointed and paid by the Ministry of Awqaf [Endowments, Religious Affairs] enabled Nasser to marshal religious support for such socialist policies as land reform and nationalization of public utilities.

8. During the course of the Iran-Iraq War, the Saudis determined they would no longer play the role of swing producer for the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which meant they would no longer cut their production to compensate for cheating by other OPEC members on their quotas. The shift in Saudi policy allowed oil prices to more nearly conform to the market, and as a consequence the price went down. In justifying their abandonment of the swing producer's role, the Saudis pointed to countries (like Iran), which, they claimed, were taking unfair advantage. The fall in prices particularly hurt countries like Algeria which were spending heavily on development projects. See Stephen Pelletiere, *The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum*, New York: Praeger, 1992.

9. Just before the 1988 riots erupted in Algeria, signalling the start of the present civil war, a scandal had surfaced involving the (apparently) accidental release of toxic mercury into the Bay of Algiers by government agencies. More recently Francis Ghiles, writing in *Middle East International* ("Is Algeria staring disaster in the face?"), February 17, 1995, opined that:

The rising tide of violence calls into question the ability of the Algerian government to implement the package of reforms it agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) last spring. Backed up by a \$1 bn IMF loan and followed by a rescheduling of that part of its \$26 bn foreign debt it owed to leading western state creditors, the agreement is due to be renewed next spring. Algeria's foreign creditors are increasingly doubtful

that loss-making state companies can be restructured, let alone privatized, with a minimum of public consensus. They are convinced it would spell political disaster if shares in such companies were sold to members of the ruling *nomenklatura*, their business intermediaries, people who have used the long-standing state monopoly of foreign trade as a means of enrichment for a quarter of a century and whose hold on the levers of power helps to explain the predicament the country is now in.

10. Among Algerians, there is a suspicion, apparently still current, that the riots were orchestrated by the security forces. Aware that popular discontent was running high, the security chiefs are supposed to have manufactured the riots, after they had lined up cadres of government supporters who would intervene to demonstrate support for the president. The intent was to allow some elements to let off steam, while showing that the mass of Algerians supported the government. Instead, the riots quickly got out of hand, and in the end nothing could stop them from escalating into a near revolt.

11. *The New York Times*, October 10, 1988. The actual figure is in dispute. Western officials in Algiers told the author that the estimates as high as 700 killed have been cited.

12. In fact, by capturing so many mayoral positions the FIS had scored a real coup, because this is where significant power resides. The *mukhtars* (mayors) dispense public service jobs (for example, as laborers on road building gangs), and many other rewards, which enable a party to consolidate its hold on the electorate.

13. This theory was offered to the author by Western officials, during interviews conducted in Algeria.

14. "Algerian Militant Issues Call For Government to Negotiate," *The New York Times*, March 31, 1995. The author has difficulty accepting this statistic—it is so high. Nonetheless, it is cited everywhere, and apparently has some legitimacy.

15. This information was provided to the author by Western officials in Algiers, during a visit there in 1992.

16. The reader should be aware that Arabic, like modern Greek, is actually two languages. There is the classical, the language of learned discourse, and the colloquial, which is commonly spoken. Classical (or modern standard Arabic) can also be spoken, but it has to be learned.

17. *Nomenklatura*—the bureaucracy in its most entrenched, hidebound manifestation. The word is Russian and was used to describe the bureaucracy as it came to be under Stalin and his successors.

18. Those who were most keenly affected were the youth, part of the baby boom that developed after the expulsion of the French and the appearance of the national

government. Roula Khalaf, writing in *The Financial Times*, (“Algiers mutiny heightens west’s dilemma,” February 24, 1995), says “nearly 60 percent of the population in Algeria is under 25, and half of them are unemployed.”

19. The predominance of the rural element in Algeria is extreme. Most dwellers in the capital, Algiers, for example, are relatively new arrivals, their residence dating back no more than 30 years. The high rate of urbanized peasants has its effect on the country’s education system. The generation that matured at the time of the national takeover spoke French, having been educated in that language. Later, youths were educated in Arabic in all but the sciences. According to Western intelligence sources, Arabic-educated youth today find themselves discriminated against by their French-speaking compatriots.

20. To be sure, no one starved in Algeria. Nonetheless, it was the case that after 1986 the standard of living dipped perceptively. For example, the author was told by a British diplomat that, when times were flush, even dustmen would vacation in France; when austerity hit such indulgences became impossible.

21. For a discussion of this, see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 1992.

22. At the time of the riots speculation was rife, in Algeria, that the Saudi government was putting money into the country to foment disturbances, preparing the way for an Islamic takeover. See *The Financial Times*, February 20, 1992, “Algeria’s new rulers turn to Gulf states for aid.” Riyadh denied this, claiming that such money as was flowing to Algeria from the Gulf was in the form of gifts by wealthy private donors, supporting bona fide Islamic charities. See Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, pp 17-18. For more background on this, see *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms*.

23. The *shari’a* is the legal code of Islam, and there have been calls for its implementation as the official law of the land in many Middle Eastern states. See Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*.

24. The best work on the founding of the Brotherhood in Egypt and its early history is Richard Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969.

25. For background on this see Robert Springborg, *Mubarak’s Egypt*, Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1992. Also see Hiro, *Holy Wars*, p. 70:

Sadat came up with the slogan: ‘Faith and Science.’ He instructed the state-run radio and television to broadcast prayers five times a day. Promising that the *shari’a* would be the chief inspiration of future legislation, he released all Brotherhood prisoners . . . He deliberately cultivated the image of ‘The Believer President.’

Also see Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, p. 199:

Sadat's encouragement of religious revivalism included a more liberal attitude toward Islamic groups, in particular the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic university student organizations. This was done to counter the influence of pro-Nasser secular leftists. Shortly after Sadat had assumed office, Muslim Brothers who had been imprisoned since the 1965 abortive coup were released; those in exile were permitted to return to public life in Egypt.

26. Hiro, *Holy Wars*, p. 70: "In May 1971 Sadat carried out a 'corrective' coup against the left-leaning Ali-Sabri group in the ruling Arab Socialist Union, and actively encouraged Islamic sentiment and groups as a counterweight to leftist influence."

27. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, p. 95, writes:

Sadat was seen by his critics as a prime example of Egypt's Westernized elite in both his personal and political life. His penchant for imported suits and pipes as well as the high public image and international profile of his half-British wife Jehan, which sharply contrasted with the more reserved public image of wives of Egyptian rulers and politicians, offended his Islamic critics. Many activists, moderate as well as radicals, rejected Sadat's reform of Muslim family law [the law governing marriage, divorce and inheritance] as Jehan's law, meaning that it was influenced by her Westernized outlook. His open-door economic policy—resulting in the higher profile of America's presence, as symbolized by a towering new embassy and an influx of U.S. businessmen—along with support for the Shah and criticism of Khomeini, and the Camp David Accords, were all regarded as evidence of Sadat's capitulation to the West.

28. The most accessible account of the assassination is Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*, New York: Random House, 1983.

29. The Brotherhood adopted the unusual tactic of running candidates on the lists of other parties. This was possible because most, if not all, parties in Egypt are mere tokens; there is no substance to any of them. Thus, it would be possible for Brotherhood-backed candidates to attach themselves to the Labor Party's list, and do so without surrendering their identity. People would know who they were, and vote accordingly. Operating in this way, the society was able to send several of its people to the parliament.

30. See Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt*.

31. See Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt: The Dilemma Facing President Mubarak*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994.

32. *Ibid.*

33. See "A cautious man amid urgent problems," *The Financial Times*, May 11, 1995.

34. See Pelletiere, *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*.

35. The author visited this area in 1969, and was cautioned at the time not to stray too far away from the tour group, and generally to be alert about offending the sensibilities of the natives. At the same time, the author has been assured that the mass of Upper Egyptians almost certainly welcomed the tourists for the revenue they brought. Actually, the zealots, and they were not a few, were the potential troublemakers.

36. According to an Egyptian journalist interviewed in Cairo, evidence of this is the erratic nature of the militants' tactics. They would target tourists, and then abruptly cease that, to move on to something else—for example, robbing Coptic jewelers. There appeared to be no logic behind the various courses that were being pursued. Their behavior also suggests a lot of what went on was purely criminal activity.

37. See Pelletiere, *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*.

38. *Ibid.*

39. See "Islamic Fundamentalists of Iran rushing to fill the void left by the Evil Empire," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, January 5, 1993; "Muslims' Fury Falls on Egypt's Christians," *The New York Times*, March 15, 1993; "The Snake of Terror in Our Garden," *The Wall Street Journal*, March 5, 1993; "Fundamentalism: Last Spasm of the 20th Century," *The New York Times*, April 6, 1993; "Egypt, Algeria Assail Iran for Backing Rebels," *The Washington Post*, April 8, 1993; and "Terrorist Network in America?," *The New York Times*, April 7, 1993.

40. See "Mubarak Cautions Islamic Extremists," *The Washington Post*, March 5, 1993.

41. Rabin visited Washington right after Mubarak. For his comments on Islamic Fundamentalism see "Israel Seeking to Convince U.S. That West Is Threatened By Iran," *The Washington Post*, March 19, 1993.

42. To be sure there were some vicious killings, but interestingly these all, by-and-large, involved police officials. In other words, the major crimes were perpetrated against police. Ahmad Abdalla, "Egypt's Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation," *Middle East Report*, July-August 1993, writes: "The main confrontation in late 1992 and early 1993 was triggered by selective assassination of 'state security' officials for their role in torturing and killing Islamists. Former and incumbent interior

ministers were the top targets.” Also, according to Abdalla, “. . . the confrontation appears to be between the police ‘family’ and the terrorist ‘family’.”

43. This particularly was the case with the attempted assassination of Egypt’s prime minister. See “Egyptian Premier Escapes Car Bomb,” *The New York Times*, November 26, 1993.

44. Not only did the Egyptians fight in wars against Israel, but many were pressed into service in the Iran-Iraq war by the Iraqis. These were Egyptians who had gone to work in Iraq, and then were forced against their will into military service. Many more Egyptians fought in Lebanon. And, of course, certain others went to Afghanistan to fight with the *mujahadin*. See Pelletiere, *The Iran-Iraq War: Chaos in a Vacuum*.

45. See “Egypt Hangs Muslim Militant,” *The Washington Post*, January 1, 1995.

46. “How Islamist militants put Egypt on trial,” *The Financial Times*, March 4, 1995.

47. Interestingly, as in the case of Algeria, there was some perception in Egypt that the security forces were behind the riots. Sadat was being pressed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to initiate austerity measures. He determined to deflect IMF pressures—so the theory goes—by announcing the subsidy cuts in a manner practically calculated to enflame the populace, counting on the fact that they would riot. After the riot was successfully put down, Sadat planned to protest to the IMF that any attempt to move further on the reforms would destabilize his government. What Sadat did not anticipate was the depth of resentment against his government—the riots, once instigated, could barely be stopped. See Mohamed Heikal, *Autumn of Fury*.

48. Mubarak has ruled by emergency decree since his predecessor’s death. Individuals running for Parliament must be approved by him, and he allows no criticism of himself or his family to be expressed in the media. The President’s situation is much like that of the Shah of Iran. The shah, too, was an autocratic ruler. Having no political party to support him, he took on himself the entire burden of rule, and when things went wrong—as they did in the late 1970s—he had to accept all of the blame. See *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, “Egypt’s anti-criticism law seen feeding violence,” June 1, 1995.

49. See Hiro, *Holy Wars*, p. 83, “In June 1985 Shaikh Hafiz Salaama, an eminent islamic leader, called for a pro-*shari’a* march from his mosque in Cairo. Mubarak responded by having the mosque surrounded by a large contingent of Central Security Police.” Also Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, p. 98, writes: “. . . in July 1985 the Mubarak government placed all private mosques under the Ministry of Endowments, arrested Salaama . . . and closed down his mosque.”

50. See Hiro, *Holy Wars*, p. 79, “(Al Jihad) was led by a 10-member committee headed by Shaikh Umar Abdul Rahman, whose *fetwa* on the legitimacy of Al Jihad’s

actions and policies was considered essential. Sometime in late 1980 he issued *afetwa* which declared Sadat to be an infidel. This made him a legitimate target for assassination.”

51. See Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt*. Also John Waterbury, *The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The Political Economy of Two Regimes*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983.

52. Ahmed Abdalla, “Egypt’s Islamists and the State: From Complicity to Confrontation,” *Middle East Report*, July-August 1993, writes, “Inadvertently, the government catapulted the Muslim Brotherhood to the forefront of the opposition.” Also see Springborg, *Mubarak's Egypt*.

53. For example, a new libel law recently went into effect, making it a crime to slander the President, his family, or anyone in his cabinet and their families. Along with that, in July Mubarak ordered the arrest of some 300 Muslim Brothers, many of them candidates to oppose the government in the November elections. See “Muslim Fundamentalists Face Trial in Cairo,” *The Washington Times*, September 6, 1995; “Behind the Smiles, Egypt Tells Mubarak to Shape Up,” *The New York Times*, July 3, 1995; and “Mubarak’s Resolve ‘Will Be Strengthened’,” *Financial Times*, June 27, 1995.

54. Esposito in *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, p. 132, writes: “. . . the post-1970 Brotherhood, under its third Supreme Guide, Tilmassani, underwent an unambiguous transformation. It clearly opted for socio-political change through a policy of moderation and gradualism, which accepted political pluralism and parliamentary democracy” Also see Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*.

55. See Ehud Sprinzak, *The Ascendance of Israel’s Radical Right*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991; also Ian Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1988. Lustick writes (p. 43):

. . . the only significant organized effort to push Israel toward permanent incorporation of the recently occupied territories was the Movement of the Whole Land of Israel. This was an elite organization of well-known writers, intellectuals, poets, generals, kibbutz leaders and other personalities prominent in the pre-1948 Zionist struggle.

56. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, (p. 37) writes:

Within the dominant Labor Zionist Movement, commitment remained strong to the principle of establishing a Jewish state in all of the ‘western Land of Israel’ [that is, from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea]. But when, in 1947, Zionism was offered a Jewish state in only part of this area, David Ben Gurion, the pragmatic leader of the Mapai (Workers of the Land) party . . . accepted the proposal.

57. Sprinzak, *The Ascendancy of Israel's Radical Right*, writes (p. 65):

A most significant response to the crisis of the Yom Kippur War (1973) was the birth of Gush Emunim in March 1974 . . . The founders...were all determined to oppose further concessions and instead help extend Israeli sovereignty over the occupied territories." Also see Yossi Melman, *The New Israelis*, New York, NY: Birch Lane Press, 1992. Melman, p. 120, writes: "For Gush Emunim, until 1977—as long as Labor was still in power—the government was the enemy from within. They took the law into their own hands and erected illegal settlements in opposition to government policy. Gush Emunim clashed with soldiers who were sent to evict them and organized violent demonstrations and blocked roads when United States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (whom they called "Jew Boy") was trying in 1974-1975 to achieve interim agreements with Egypt and Syria.

58. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, p. 42.

59. Sprinzak, *The Ascendancy of Israel's Radical Right*, p. 3:

60. See Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994.

61. Lustick, *For the Land and the Lord*, writes (p. 40): "From 1977 until the end of 1984, two Likud governments poured more than a \$1 billion into Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip." See Also Melman, *The New Israelis*, p. 121. According to Melman, "When (Labor) fell and Begin (of Likud) became premier, Gush Emunim . . . added the considerable support of the government. The historic alliance between Zionism and the Labor government had been replaced with a new pact between Likud and the religious parties."

62. See Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories*.

63. There is some dispute over which branch of the Brotherhood moved into the occupied territories—the Jordanian branch, or the branch that was in Gaza under the Egyptian occupation. Gaza was seized by the Egyptians in the 1948 war. The Egyptian military administered it until Cairo lost the area to Israel in 1967. It was while Egypt held sway there that the Brotherhood matured in Gaza—however, as was the case with the Brotherhood in Egypt, when Nasser purged the group, the Gaza branch went underground. If it was the original Egyptian branch that resurfaced there in the mid-1970s, this group would have no connections to the King of Jordan. Ziad Abu-Amr believes that it was the Jordanian branch that reappeared in the 1970s. See Ziad Abu-Amr, *Islamic*

Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza, Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994, pp. 1-22.

64. *Ibid.*

65. An Israeli driver rammed a truck bearing Palestinian laborers, killing four. Palestinians claimed this was a deliberate assault. See Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories*.

66. See Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*; also *Islamic Fundamentalism in the West Bank and Gaza*.

67. See “Why Gaza Mostly Says Yes,” *Middle East International*, September 24, 1993.

68. It was beyond the scope of this monograph to go into the Syrian-Brotherhood clash. Briefly, the Brotherhood carried on a quasi-guerrilla war against the regime of Syrian President Hafez Assad in the early 1980s. Finally, in 1984, Assad cracked down, killing some 20,000 Brothers and Brotherhood supporters. For details see Stephen C. Pelletiere, *Assad and the Peace Process: The Pivotal Role of Lebanon*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995.

69. See Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah: The Radical Challenge to Israel in the Occupied Territories*.

70. *Ibid.*

71. For background on Hizbollah’s Iran connection, see Kenneth Katzman, “Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon,” in *Terrorism: National Security Policy and the Home Front*, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995; also Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah*.

72. The individual behind Hizbollah’s founding, and its earliest influential backer, was then-Iranian Ambassador to Damascus, Moteshami-Pur. Moteshami-Pur is still a power in Iran, and an opponent of Iran’s president Hashemi Rafsanjani. These two lead opposing wings of the government, and from this split Hizbollah derives some maneuver room.

73. Interestingly there are hints in the literature that the progenitor movement of Hizbollah, the so-called Foundation for the Oppressed, may have been bankrolled initially by the Shah of Iran, and meant to be a counterweight to leftist groups attempting to organize the Shia. If so, this would be in line with the formation of all the other conservative Islamic groups—the FIS, *Gamiyat* and Hamas. See Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah*.

74. See Katzman, “Hizbollah: Narrowing Options in Lebanon.”

75. This was an agreement brokered by Riyadh, under which an attempt was made to end the long, costly Lebanese civil war. In addition to working out a more equitable power-sharing arrangement between the various ethnic groups, the agreement provided for disarming the militias.

76. See "Killing of 9 Israeli Soldiers Sets Off Bitter Dispute," *The New York Times*, August 23, 1993.

77. See "Rabin Criticizes Soldiers at Lebanon Post Raided By Guerrillas," *The New York Times*, November 2, 1994.

78. See Israel Shahak, "Israel's war in south Lebanon," *Middle East International*, February 3, 1995.

79. See "Lebanon: the Last Arab-Israeli Battlefront," *The Washington Post*, March 10, 1995.

80. See "Israeli jets attack Hezbollah bases after border raid," *The Times of London*, February 20, 1995.

81. For background on the 1953 Iran-Britain oil dispute see George Lenczowski, *The Middle East in World Affairs*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984.

82. See David Gardner, "From Guns to Soup Kitchens," *The Financial Times*, April 10, 1995.

83. By language, the author is primarily focusing on discourse, that is the terms in which the language of a particular class of people is expressed. Among the peasants language is heavily influenced by the Koran, and images and anecdotes connected to the faith. Thus, the clerics, couching their exchanges with the peasants in the language of the Koran, are able to make contact quickly, and understanding is likely to be nearly complete. For an example of how this worked in the case of Khomeini and the Islamic revolt in Iran see Stephen Pelletiere, *The Iran-Iraq War-Chaos in a Vacuum*, Westport, CT: Praeger, 1992.

84. This is the *zakat*. The author has been told this tax is actually quite nominal.

85. Esposito, *Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?*, p. 96, writes: "Sadat used government control of nationalized mosques and religious institutions, and the dependence of the religious establishment on the government for salaries, to dictate and control sermons and mosque activities." See also Stephen Pelletiere, *Mass Action and Islamic Fundamentalism: The Revolt of the Brooms*.

86. This fear is prevalent in all Arab countries—the fear of the mob set loose. It probably explains the endurance power of the Iraqi Ba’thists, for example, since Iraq, prior to the coming of the Ba’th, existed in a virtual state of anarchy for years, with the populace going in fear of random violence.

87. For a discussion of this issue of Muslim responses to evil see Pelletiere, *Hamas and Hizbollah*.

88. See “How Islamicist militants put Egypt on trial,” *The Financial Times*, March 4, 1995.

89. The author sees some striking similarities between this phenomenon and the Luddite movement in England. During the first three decades of the 19th century, workers in England, as a response to rising unemployment, smashed machinery, attacked supervisors, and generally performed seemingly irrational acts of violence. Much of this activity appeared to be taking place spontaneously, and with barely any direction, nor were the workers organized in any formal sense. See David Noble, *Progress Without People: In Defense of Luddism*, Chicago, IL: Charles H. Kerr Publishing Co., 1993.

90. See Nunzio Pernicone, *Italian Anarchism: 1864-1892*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.

91. It is instructive here to consider the behavior of the bazaaris in Iran, during the crisis over the Shah. At a certain point Iran’s merchant class, the so-called bazaaris, decided that the Shah’s policies on foreign trade were directly inimical to their interests. The Shah was attempting at the time to open Iran to world trade, essentially what the IMF is trying to get Mubarak to do. Once the bazaaris determined that the Shah would actually take this step, and that nothing would dissuade him, they abandoned his regime, and financed the Khomeini revolution, which sealed the Shah’s doom.

92. It will take some research to fathom why this is so. In *Shari’a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*, the author researched the Arabic press and was struck how consistently the Brotherhood refused to take a stance condemning the radicals. Robert Springborg, in *Mubarak’s Egypt* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1992), speculates that the conservatives are unwilling to do so, because, even though the radicals pursue tactics that are anathema to them, they remain Muslims. Thus the conservatives are showing their solidarity to fellow believers. Esposito, *The Islamic Threat*, p. 98, writes: “The degree of polarization between the government and moderate opposition groups was reflected in the failure of the opposition leaders to distance themselves completely from extremist acts. When a disturbed border policeman killed several Israeli tourists . . . Muslim Brotherhood leaders . . . described the killings as an act against the ‘enemies of the nation’.”

93. This is the “Rome declaration,” a national contract signed in January by Algeria’s opposition parties, including the FIS. The contract calls for negotiations with the

government on an interim administration leading to elections. See Roula Khalaf, "Algiers mutiny heightens west's dilemma," *The Financial Times*, February 24, 1994.

94. In April 1994, an Egyptian attorney who had defended Islamic militants died while in police custody. His death was attributed by the authorities to asthma, but human rights groups claimed he was tortured to death. When Egyptian attorneys demonstrated in protest over the incident, the Cairo police opened fire on them. See "Egyptian government moves to defuse conflict with lawyers," *The Philadelphia Inquirer*, June 29, 1994; also "U.S. Said to Ask Egypt About Lawyer's Death," *The New York Times*, May 27, 1994.

95. See Pelletiere, *Shari'a Law, Cult Violence and System Change in Egypt*.

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